This paper analyzes the effects of loan supply, as well as aggregate demand, aggregate supply and monetary policy shocks between 1998 and 2014 in Macedonia using a structural vector autoregression model with sign restrictions and Bayesian estimation. The main results indicate that loan supply shocks have no significant effect on loan volumes and lending rates, or on economic activity and prices. The effects of monetary policy on lending activity are fairly limited, although there is some evidence that it affects lending rates more than loan volumes. Monetary policy shocks have strong effects on inflation, while the central bank reacts strongly to adverse shocks hitting the economy. Baseline results are confirmed by several robustness checks. According to historical decomposition, the lending activity was supporting economic growth before and during the crisis, but its contribution became negative during the recovery and it was a drag on growth until the end of the period. Pre-crisis GDP growth is mostly explained Croatian Economic Survey : Vol. 18 : No. 1 : June 2016 : pp. 5-33 by supportive monetary policy. However, the restrictive monetary policy during the crisis contributed to the fall of GDP, before becoming supportive again during the early stages of the recovery. Policy rates in recent years mostly reflect subdued lending activity and aggregate supply factors, which the central bank tries to counteract with a more accommodative policy.
Introduction 1
The issue of loan supply shocks has been gaining attention in the literature, mostly as a reflection of the financial crisis and its effects on domestic economic activity. Most empirical studies on loan supply shocks use Bayesian SVAR with sign restrictions. Barnett and Thomas (2014) find that loan supply shocks explain most of the weakness in lending in the UK since the onset of the crisis and between a third and a half of the fall in GDP below its historic trend. Halvorsen and Jacobsen (2014) also find that lending shocks explain between 10 and 20 percent of output gap variance in Norway and the UK. Regarding the euro area, Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2012) find that loan supply shocks have had a strong effect on lending and GDP growth during the financial crisis, with some cross-country heterogeneity regarding the timing and the magnitude of the shocks. Studies on Hungary (Tamási and Világi, 2011 ) and on Australia, Canada and the UK (Finlay and Jääskelä, 2014) , also find that the role of loan supply shocks in the recent crisis was important, although it was not dominant. This paper analyzes the effects of loan supply shocks in Macedonia between 1998 and 2014, as well as the effects of other key macroeconomic shocks, i.e., 1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia. The authors are grateful to Haroon Mumtaz of the Queen Mary University of London for sharing his code and for the helpful advice provided. We are also grateful to four anonymous referees, as well as to the participants of the 19th Session of the NBRM Researchers' Club for useful comments.
Data and Methodology

Data
In the early years of the transition period, economic growth in Macedonia was volatile, while lending activity was anaemic. During that period, the country was also hit by several large internal and external shocks. Consequently, the central bank (National Bank of the Republic of Macedonia, NBRM) was mostly implementing a restrictive monetary policy in order to eliminate pressures on foreign reserves and to maintain the fixed exchange rate.
An expansion of bank lending started around the early 2000s, following the reforms of the banking system and wider structural and institutional reforms.
Combined with the stable macroeconomic environment and the absence of external shocks, the higher lending was associated with acceleration in economic growth rates (Figure 1 ). With no significant pressures on the price level and the current account, the central bank was able to maintain the exchange rate peg to the euro, while at the same time relaxing the monetary policy. However, the global crisis put an end to this process. Post-crisis economic growth has been lower or slightly negative (in 2009 and 2012) , while lending growth rates are continuously lower than in the pre-crisis period and remain at a moderate level.
In addition, the central bank had to fight pressures on foreign reserves by raising policy rates and additional restrictive measures during the first wave of the crisis.
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In our analysis, we use quarterly data between 1998Q1 and 2014Q4 ( Figure   2 ), which is the maximum sample available at the time of writing. Standard information criteria indicate that a VAR of two lags is appropriate. The variables included in our baseline VAR are: the seasonally-adjusted quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth, the seasonally-adjusted quarter-on-quarter CPI inflation rate, the policy rate (rate on central bank bills), the quarter-on-quarter change in total outstanding volume of local currency (denar) loans and the corresponding average weighted lending rate, i.e., the rate on the total outstanding volume of denar loans. We also include a constant term in the VAR. Although most studies use the GDP deflator as an indicator of price movements, we decided to use consumer price inflation because it is the indicator monetary policy-makers usually focus on when making policy decisions (Halvorsen and Jacobsen, 2014) , which is also the case in Macedonia. Further, by using the policy rate, we deviate from most of the literature, which tends to use interbank rates as an indicator of the monetary policy stance. However, in circumstances of continuous surplus liquidity in the banking system, the interbank money market in Macedonia is relatively shallow and its role is fairly limited. In addition, the correlation between policy rates and money market rates is very high, and policy rates are fully transmitted to money market rates (Veličkovski, 2006; Bogoev and Petrevski, 2012 (Peersman, 2005; Mumtaz, Solovyeva and Vasilieva, 2012) . We decided to follow the latter studies and use quarter-on-quarter percent changes of GDP and loans and the quarter-on-quarter inflation rate, while interest rates enter as percentages.
Methodology
Our empirical investigation is based on structural vector autoregression (SVAR) with sign restrictions. This method was first proposed in the context of monetary policy studies by Uhlig (2005) , Canova and De Nicolo (2002) and Faust (1998) and is dominant in the recent empirical literature on loan supply shocks. We use Bayesian estimation with a normal inverse Wishart prior for the SVAR coefficients and the covariance matrix, with 10.000 Gibbs iterations and 1.000 retained draws 2 .
Since we have five endogenous variables in our model, we could identify at most five structural shocks. However, proceeding in this manner requires complicated identification restrictions and increases the computational burden (Busch, Scharnagl and Scheithauer, 2010) . On the other hand, identifying only a few shocks can result in a large amount of unexplained movements. Studies on loan supply that use SVAR with sign restrictions identify two shocks at the 2 Our estimations were carried out using the codes by Haroon Mumtaz, which can be downloaded from https:// sites.google.com/site/hmumtaz77/code, as well as the handbook by Blake and Mumtaz (2012) . We decided to closely follow Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2012) and the literature surveyed therein in the identification of shocks for two main reasons. First, identifying several shocks enables a richer economic analysis (Paustian, 2007) , i.e., it will enable us to disentangle their separate effects on key macroeconomic variables and to explain a bigger share of the latter. Second, Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser (2012) supply (and other macroeconomic) shocks, and not so much in their particular sources 3 . In addition, this means that the model is kept relatively simple and the interpretation is straightforward. On the other hand, with this approach we are unable to distinguish between sources of shocks, which might be important for a small open economy like Macedonia. In particular, we suspect such a distinction might be important for aggregate demand and supply shocks, albeit not so much for loan supply shocks, bearing in mind that lending in Macedonia is financed almost entirely by domestic deposits. In addition, the inclusion of foreign shocks could lower the unexplained part in the historical decomposition and the forecast error variance decomposition below.
We identify the following four shocks (Table 1) Bearing this in mind, we decided to only impose contemporaneous restrictions in our baseline specification, while below we also check the robustness of the baseline results to imposing restrictions in two quarters.
Restrictions for the identification 4 of aggregate supply, aggregate demand and monetary policy shocks draw on the VAR studies by Peersman (2005) and Fratzscher, Saborowski and Straub (2009) , as well as DSGE studies by Straub and Peersman (2006) and Canova and Paustian (2011) . The aggregate supply shock is identified by imposing restrictions so that GDP growth and inflation move in opposite directions, i.e., an adverse supply shock leads to a contemporaneous rise of prices and fall of GDP. As a reaction to these movements, the central bank reacts with higher interest rates. Aggregate supply shocks can be of various nature: shocks to the production function or production factors, shocks to labor or non-labor costs of production, shocks to the price-setting behavior, technology shocks or oil shocks (Musso, 2009) . The policy shock is identified via tighter monetary policy (higher interest rates), which causes a contemporaneous fall of GDP and prices. Finally, in order to identify an aggregate demand shock, we restrict GDP growth and inflation to move in the same direction (i.e., they both fall). In such a case, the policy rate also falls as the central bank reacts with an expansionary policy. In addition, the negative aggregate demand shock is also accompanied by a contemporaneous fall of lending interest rates, for two main reasons. First, lower aggregate demand probably causes lower demand for loans, which is generally accompanied by lower lending rates. Second, the lower policy rate in the wake of the negative aggregate demand shock will also cause lower lending rates, even with incomplete transmission of monetary policy.
Aggregate demand shocks may also be quite diverse, and may reflect changes in consumption or preference, investment demand shocks or fiscal policy shocks (Gambetti and Musso, 2012) .
The identification of loan supply shocks also relies on the relevant literature.
Loan supply shocks may reflect a combination of factors from the financial sector, such as changes in financing conditions, changes in competition, changes in the quality of borrowers (Hristov, Hülsewig and Wollmershäuser, 2012) 6 In all cases we present median impulse responses, as well as confidence bands of 16th and 84th percentiles, in line with Sims and Zha (1999) and the relevant literature using sign restrictions.
Baseline Results
Rilind Kabashi and Katerina Suleva
both lending rates and loan volumes to aggregate supply shocks is insignificant during the entire horizon. Source: Authors' calculations.
Next, we analyze the response to a restrictive monetary policy shock (Figure 4 ).
The policy rate rises on impact, in line with the sign restrictions, and this reaction is maintained for several quarters. This protracted reaction indicates some inertia in monetary policy decisions, which is to be expected. The restrictive monetary policy shock has a relatively strong effect on prices, which fall on impact, and remain significantly lower for about a year. On the other hand, the reaction of GDP is insignificant beyond the period of the restriction. This indicates that monetary policy does not affect inflation via economic activity, but its effect on prices is direct. One possible explanation for this would be that monetary policy affects inflationary expectations and then inflation due to the strong credibility of the central bank, which might be related to the relatively long and successful maintenance of the pegged exchange rate regime. Finally, the reaction of lending variables, which are left unrestricted, is insignificant throughout the period.
The insignificant reaction of lending rates (and volumes) indicates a weak monetary policy transmission mechanism, which is broadly in line with findings from other studies regarding the transmission of policy rates to other interest rates in Macedonia (Veličkovski, 2006; Bogoev and Petrevski, 2012) . Further, our finding of an insignificant effect of monetary policy shocks on GDP is similar to Jovanovic, Krstevska and Popovska-Kamnar (2015) , who use a smaller VAR with recursive identification over a similar period in Macedonia, although they do find some evidence of weak effects of monetary policy when using regimeswitching VARs and other monetary policy instruments. On the other hand, unlike their finding of insignificant response of inflation, we find that monetary policy shocks do have a direct effect on price movements. significantly lower for a relatively long period, which indicates that adverse demand shocks are met with a relatively long-lived reaction by the central bank with a more relaxed policy. The lending rate falls on impact, and this reaction is quite persistent, as it remains significant for over four years, thus mirroring the lower policy rates. On the other hand, the response of the loan volume is insignificant, which is somewhat surprising given the lower lending rates. Finally, Figure 6 shows the reaction to an adverse loan supply shock. In line with the sign restrictions, the loan supply shock initially causes opposite movements of loan volumes and rates. This effect on lending rates is quite prolonged, as they are higher for quite a long period, although both lending rates and volumes become insignificant fairly quickly. The impact on other variables is quite limited. GDP falls on impact due to the restriction, but is insignificant thereinafter. Source: Authors' calculations. The response of inflation, which is left unrestricted, is insignificant throughout the period. The only reaction that is significant for a longer period is the one of monetary policy, which reacts with lower rates on impact due to the sign restrictions, and is more relaxed for about a year after the adverse loan supply shock. Overall, this implies that, if the supply of loans falls, the central bank tries to counteract by relaxing its policy, which is usually successful, since loan supply shocks do not result in a significant decline in loan volumes, and they also do not cause a contraction in GDP and a fall in prices. Table 2 presents results of the forecast error variance decomposition (FEVD). The left panel indicates that aggregate supply and monetary policy are the main drivers of economic activity, as their shocks each explain around a fifth of the forecast error variance of GDP growth. Loan supply shocks explain around 10 percent of the variance of GDP on impact, and this share rises to around 13 percent for the variance after a year. The right panel shows the contribution of loan supply to the FEVD of all variables. Besides the noted effect on GDP, loan supply shocks also explain between 10 and 13 percent of the variance of prices and loan volumes, while their effect on lending rates is somewhat lower. In order to analyze the recent crisis, we also present the historical decomposition between 2007Q1 and 2014Q4. In line with other studies (Barnett and Thomas, 2014; Finlay and Jääskelä, 2014) , Figure 7 shows the decomposition of deviations of variables from their trend values instead of actual variables. For ease of exposition, decompositions of GDP, inflation and loan volumes are presented in year-on-year terms.
Results in Figure 7 lend additional support to our decision to identify several structural shocks, since they display a rich and plausible economic interpretation.
The decomposition of year-on-year GDP growth indicates that, in the period immediately preceding the crisis, above-trend GDP growth was mostly driven supply shocks were dragging down GDP growth in the period immediately preceding and during the crisis, their effect in the last two years is positive, which probably reflects the lack of global and domestic inflationary pressures.
The second panel of Figure 7 indicates a relatively strong contribution of monetary policy shocks to inflation, which is in line with impulse responses analyzed previously. Monetary policy contributed considerably to the high inflation before the crisis and the falling inflation during the crisis, while its effect is weaker during the recovery. The contribution of other factors is relatively small, as aggregate supply, aggregate demand and loan supply shocks all contributed to higher inflation before the crisis and lower inflation during the crisis, and they also help explain price movements during the recovery.
Determinants of the policy rate vary across the period. Accommodative policy rates during the pre-crisis boom are mostly due to policy shocks (and unidentified factors). In the wake of the crisis, policy rates were tightened mostly as a result of monetary policy shocks, reflecting the determination of the central bank to stop the loss of foreign exchange reserves, while there was an additional contribution by aggregate supply shocks and unidentified factors. On the other hand, during the recovery, the below-trend movement of policy rates is mostly explained by loan supply shocks, thus confirming the previous finding that monetary policy tries to counteract negative loan supply movements.
The last two panels show that loan supply shocks have a stronger impact on lending rates than on loan volumes. In particular, they contribute to downward movements of lending rates almost throughout the period analyzed. During the crisis, above-trend lending rates are partially explained by more restrictive policy rates, whereas before and after the crisis monetary policy contributes to lower lending rates. On the other hand, all the shocks contribute positively to the above-trend loan volume changes before the crisis, with monetary policy shocks exerting the strongest influence. As the crisis hit, the combined effect of factors became negative, thus driving and keeping loan volumes below trend until the end of the sample. 
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Robustness Checks
An important issue of interest is whether baseline results are an artefact of the particular duration of the sign restrictions imposed to identify the shocks. In the baseline specification, restrictions are imposed only contemporaneously, whereas the responses are left unrestricted thereinafter. In the alternative specification, we try to capture the delay that might be characteristic for some of the relations analyzed, since some of these variables may be more inertial and not react immediately to shocks. Therefore, we impose the same restrictions not only contemporaneously, but also for an additional period, i.e., restrictions are imposed in two quarters. Figure 8 shows that responses with this alternative specification are fairly similar to the baseline results, and this applies to the magnitude, the sign and the significance of responses. The only difference appears in the significance of responses of lending rates to monetary policy and loan supply shocks. In particular, unlike the insignificant responses in the baseline specification, the lending rate responds significantly to these shocks when the alternative restrictions are used, thus yielding results that are more plausible.
The rise of lending rates in the wake of an adverse monetary policy shock is now significant for more than a year, thus strengthening the previous finding from the baseline analysis that monetary policy is transmitted via lending rates (and not lending volumes). The alternative restrictions also strengthen the finding that loan supply shocks are mostly manifested through higher lending interest rates, despite a more accommodative monetary policy in this case. However, this reaction of lending rates to loan supply shocks is now significant, whereas we confirm the insignificant response of loan volumes. We also wanted to check whether our results hold across the entire period, or are there any structural breaks or differences in the response of the variables to shocks. Such an analysis could be performed by using time-varying parameter VAR, which is, however, unfeasible in our case due to the length of available data series. Therefore, we carry out the stability analysis by using rolling 10-year VARs with one-year steps, i.e., we have eight subsamples: the first one for the In another check, we replaced local currency with total loan volumes and corresponding total lending rates. Although untypical, such a definition might be appropriate in the case of Macedonia due to the sizeable euroization and the possible effects of monetary policy decisions on the portfolio mix between local and foreign currency holdings and loans. However, differences between the two specifications were fairly small, probably reflecting the similar movements of the denar and total loans and the corresponding lending rates (Figure 2 ). The analysis also indicates that loan supply was supporting economic growth before and during the crisis, but its contribution became negative during the recovery and it continued to act as a drag on growth until the end of 2014.
In the period preceding the global crisis, monetary policy was one of the key factors driving above-trend GDP growth. When the crisis hit in late 2008 and in 2009, the effect of monetary policy turned to negative, as it was trying to stop the loss of foreign exchange reserves and stabilize expectations. Once this was achieved and monetary policy was relaxed, its contribution to the recovery became positive, although the effect in recent years is again mildly negative.
Further, policy rates in recent years are mostly explained by subdued lending activity and aggregate supply factors, which the central bank tries to counteract with a more accommodative policy.
